Article I, Section 6
Duffy v. Tatum, 354 A.3d 14 (Pa. Super Ct.), per Panella, P.J.E, the Superior Court held that a strict burden of proof is necessary to demonstrate a person’s unambiguous manifestation of assent to arbitration under Article I, Section 6 in the context of an online contract for services. This requires “ (1) explicitly stating on the registration website and application screens that a consumer is waiving their right to a jury trial when the person agrees to the seller’s terms of service and the registration cannot be completed until the person is fully informed of that waiver; and (2) when the agreements are available for viewing after a user has clicked on a hyperlink, the waiver should not be hidden in the middle of the document but should appear prominently in bold, capitalized text.” Additionally, the Court held that the average internet user would find the term “arbitration” ambiguous and that it needed definition, itself.
Article I, Section 7
In re Cohen, 349 A.3d 865 (Pa. 2026), per Dougherty, J., the Court upheld the suspension of Judge Mark B. Cohen for his continued partisan social media posts following his appointment to the bench. The Court concluded that the free speech rights of judges are subject to a balancing test under the First Amendment, in which the free speech rights of the judge are weighed against the Commonwealth’s interest in maintaining the efficiency, independence, and impartiality of the judiciary. Notably, this balancing test does not apply to judges’ rhetoric within the context of their own elections. Ultimately, the Court found against Judge Cohen, ruling that the Commonwealth’s interests outweighed Cohen’s interest in making partisan social media posts. The Court acknowledges that the First Amendment and Article I, § 7 are coterminous in this context.
Gregro v. Gonzalez, __A.3d__, 2026 WL 1129688 (Pa. Super. Ct.), per Panella, P.J.E., the Superior Court held a gag order unconstitutional under Article I, Section 7. A trial court imposed the gag order on a father following social media comments disparaging his wife following a custody case. Using the federal O’Brien test, the court concluded that the order failed intermediate scrutiny. Specifically, the Commonwealth failed to make specific factual findings that a father’s social media posts endangered his child. The court found the gag order unconstitutional under both the state and federal constitutions.
Article I, Section 8
Commonwealth v. Foster, 356 A.3d 747 (Pa. 2026), per Dougherty, J., the Supreme Court held that under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, an officer who received reports of gunshots in a certain area and at the location saw an individual get out of his car and walk towards his house had sufficient reasonable suspicion to support an investigative stop. The individual was later charged with DUI and operating his vehicle with a suspended license. The Court reasoned that under the totality of the circumstances, there existed reasonable suspicion to justify the stop under Article I Section 8 and did not rely on the Fourth Amendment. Justices Donohue and Wecht filed dissenting opinions, both arguing that there were insufficient circumstances to raise reasonable suspicion.
Commonwealth v. Herlth, __A.3d__, 2026 WL 1616118 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2026), per Stabile, J., the Superior Court held that under Article I, Section 8, an officer who shined a flashlight through a one-inch hole in a shoebox conducted a search for which he needed a warrant to do. An officer, inside of a residence supporting emergency medical personnel called to the house to provide emergency medical assistance, found a variety of drugs and arrested the box’s owner. The court rejected the argument that the contents of the shoe box were in plain view because the small hole in the shoebox did not overcome the owner’s reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of the closed shoebox in his own home. This holding was supported by the fact the officer was only in the apartment to accompany medical personnel, not because he suspected criminal activity.
Article I, Section 9
Commonwealth v. Belgrave, 353 A.3d 550 (Pa. 2026), per Wecht, J., the Court held that under Article I, Section 9, it is harmful prosecutorial misconduct to call a defendant’s alleged accomplice before a jury with the foreknowledge that the witness would invoke his Fifth Amendment protections and refuse to answer any questions. The Court held that the conduct was prejudicial to the defendant because the prosecutor was asking the jury to infer information based on the witness’s refusal to answer questions.
Article I, Section 10
Scott v. Department of Environmental Protection, 356 A.3d 946 (Pa. Commw. Ct.), per Wallace, J., the Commonwealth Court held that under Article I, Section 10, the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) did not perpetrate a taking by granting permits allowing a private company to drill oil and gas wells through the petitioner’s coal seams. The granting of the permit was not a physical taking because the guidelines for granting these permits are statutorily defined and only factually addressed the workability of the coal. Further, the Court held that the permit did not eliminate all economically beneficial or productive use of the petitioner property. Pennsylvania has adopted the US Supreme Court’s takings analysis for Article I, Section 10 issues.
Article I, Section 13
Commonwealth v. Lee, 2026 WL 855614 (Pa. 2026), per Todd, C.J., the Court held that under Article I, Section 13, a mandatory sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole for felony murder is unconstitutional without an assessment of individual culpability. The Court used the Edmunds framework and determined that Article I, Section 13 provides greater protections than the analogous Eight Amendment and embodies the principle that “citizens are protected from sanctions that are disproportionate to the circumstances of the offense for which they were convicted.” The Court stayed the order for 120 days to allow the General Assembly time to consider remedial measures.
Article I, Section 21
Firearm Owners Against Crime-Institute for Legislative Legal, and Education Action v. City of Harrisburg, 352 A.3d 130 (Pa. Commw. Ct.), per Wolf, J., in the context of pre-enforcement standing to challenge certain provisions of the Harrisburg City Code that restricted the possession and use of a firearm within the city, the Commonwealth Court reaffirmed that the traditional standing test applies when plaintiffs seek pre-enforcement review of legislation. The appellants showed a “substantial, direct, and immediate interest in the outcome of the litigation,” thus permitting them to seek pre-enforcement of legislation that affected their right under Article I, § 21 right to bear arms. The Court reversed the holding of the trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings.
Article I, Section 28
Allegheny Reproductive Health Center v. Pennsylvania Department of Human Services, __A.3d__ 2026 WL 1053998 (Pa. Commw. Ct.), per Wolf, J., the Commonwealth Court held the abortion coverage exclusion of Pennsylvania’s medical assistance program unconstitutional under Article I, Section 28 and violative of Article I, Section 26. Crucially, the court also found a fundamental right to reproductive freedom. The court held that the Commonwealth failed to overcome the presumption of unconstitutionality of the coverage exclusion on all counts. McCullough, J. and Wallace, J. wrote dissenting opinions.
Article II, Section 1
Fick v. Bivens, __A.3d__, 2026 WL 1488028 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2026), per Covey, J., the Commonwealth Court held that the Pennsylvania State Police’s (PSP) internal interpretation of simple assault as a crime of violence or as a disqualifying criminal offense for the purposes of denying certifications to carry firearms violated Article II, Section 1. The court found that the General Assembly did not authorize the PSP to modify the statutorily-supplied qualification certification criteria, which only disqualifies individuals based on a conviction of a violent crime, as defined by PSP’s regulations. Because simple assault is not a crime of violence as defined in the PSP regulations, PSP’s interpretation violated the Non-Delegation Doctrine.
Article III, Section 4
Honey v. Lycoming County Offices of Voter Services, 355 A.3d 801 (Pa. 2026), per McCaffery, J., the Supreme Court held subjecting cast vote records (CVRs) to public disclosure does not facially violate the constitutional command of voter secrecy under Article VII, Section 4. An individual sought judicial review of the Office of Open Records denying their attempt to access digital copies of the county’s CVRs under the Right-To-Know Law. The Court balanced the constitutional interest in secrecy against the public interest in ensuring accurate and trustworthy election results. The decision was unanimous. Justice Wecht filed a concurring opinion.
Article V, Section 10
Hernandez v. Zook, 351 A.3d 795 (Pa. Super. Ct.), per Kunselman, J., the Superior Court addressed an appeal from a defamation suit stemming from emails accusing Hernandez of various illegal activities, including elder abuse and involvement in organized crime. Zook filed an untimely motion to dismiss under Pennsylvania’s Uniform Public Expression Protection Act (UPEPA), an anti-SLAPP law designed to protect individuals from meritless lawsuits on public issues. While the court denied the motion to dismiss for procedural issues, the court also indicated that UPEPA may be unconstitutional under Article V, § 10(c). Although it did not address the constitutional issue, the court highlighted that statutes that conflict with the Pennsylvania Rules of Court are invalid under Article V, § 10(c).
Article V, Section 2
Commonwealth v. Brown, __A.3d__, 2026 WL 1737056 (Pa. 2026), per Dougherty J., the Supreme Court took the case under its King’s Bench power regarding a facially untimely PCRA petition where the petitioner claimed violations of the federal constitution. The Court explained that its King’s Bench power is “very high and transcendent,” and is only limited by the constitutions of the United States and Pennsylvania. Additionally, the remedies employed by the court are not bound by existing rules, procedures, or statutes. This case reinforces the vast nature of the King’s Bench power. Ultimately, the Court remanded the case and held that in any PCRA case in which the Philadelphia County District Attorney’s Office concedes that post-conviction relief is warranted, the PCRA court must allow the Office of the Attorney General an opportunity to intervene.
Article VIII, Section 1
Downington Area School District v. Chester County Board of Assessment Appeals Tax Parcel No.:35-5-43.3, 356 A.3d 802 (Pa. 2026), per Mundy, J., the Supreme Court held that the use of a monetary-threshold policy by a taxing district to determine which property assessments to appeal does not violate Article VIII, Section 1. A school district implemented a policy that only appeals property assessments that may result in additional tax revenue of at least $10,000 per year. The Court found that such a policy strengthened uniformity by selecting for appeal those properties whose assessments are the most non-uniform in terms of their tax-liability deficit. These monetary-threshold policies are constitutional as long as they are applied without regard to impermissible characteristics, such as owner residency status. Justices Donohue and Dougherty dissented. Justice Donohue emphasized that the decision undermines principles of uniformity by prioritizing revenue over equitable taxation. Justice Dougherty argued that these policies are unconstitutional because they create subclassifications based on property value increases.
Devon Horse Show & County Fair, Inc. v. Easttown Township, 2026 WL 1962584 (E.D. Pa. 2026), per Nitza I. Quinones Alejandro, J., the United States District Court for the Eastern District held that the fees charged by Easttown Township for the Devon Horse Show’s Special Event Permits in 2022, 2023, and 2024 violated the Uniformity Clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Under the authority of a 2018 ordinance, the Township taxed the event more than what was commensurate with the expense of holding the event, resulting in a windfall for the police department. The court concluded that the Township’s actions violated the requirement that all taxes be uniform upon the same class of subjects within the taxing jurisdiction.
Article VIII, Section 2
Misingwa Land Trust v. Board of Commissioners of County of Beaver, __A.3d__, 2026 WL 1740622 (Pa. Commw. Ct.), per Leavitt, J., the Commonwealth Court overruled the lower court’s approach to the five-factor “HUP test” to exempt institutions of purely public charity from property taxation and remanded the case. The land at issue was seven parcels of land owned by the Land Trust, a conservation group. The court remanded the case and ordered the lower court to adhere to its interpretations of the Charitable Purpose, Benefit to a Substantial and Indefinite Class of Persons, and Relief of Government Burden prongs.
Article IX, Section 1
Borough of West Chester v. Pennsylvania State System of Higher Education, 355 A.3d 886 (Pa. 2026), per Brobson, J., the Pennsylvania Supreme Court determined that under Article IX, Section 1, the Borough of West Chester’s stormwater charge constituted a local tax, not a fee for service. The court applied a two-step test to distinguish between a service fee and local tax. The Court concluded that because the Borough was acting out of a duty to comply with federal and state mandates, the stormwater charge was for a public benefit, not a quasi-private capacity. Accordingly, the charge was a tax that the Pennsylvania State System of Higher Education was immune from paying an agent of the Commonwealth.
Misc.
Bell v. Wilkinsburg School District, 349 A.3d 810 (Pa. 2026), per J. Dougherty, J., the Court held that the Charter School Law (CSL) required a school district to provide students at public charter schools free transportation but did not mandate that the district afford the same mode of transportation for all students. Because the Court determined the language of the CSL to be clear and unambiguous and the constitutional issue was waived, it did not address the appellants claims that the ruling may result in unequal treatment among similarly situated students. Justice Mundy’s dissent advocates for such equal treatment.
Commonwealth v. Arnett, 353 A.3d 705 (Pa. 2026), per Wecht, J., the Court held that the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA) is not a viable mechanism to challenge the constitutionality of the Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act II (SORNA II) because the PCRA applies only to petitions related to one’s conviction or sentence, not non-punitive consequences of the sentence. The Court declined to consider other challenges to SORNA II, including pursuing a writ of habeas corpus. However, Justice Brobson, concurring and dissenting, would find a writ of mandamus filed in the Commonwealth Court’s original jurisdiction is the only proper avenue for removal from SORNA’s registry.
Commonwealth v. Wagner, __A.3d__, 2026 WL 1828650 (Pa. Super. 2026), per Bender, P.J.E., the Superior Court addressed an appeal by a “sovereign citizen” who argued that law enforcement violated a litany of his federal and state constitutional rights when he was stopped for, among other things, failure to display a registration plate and operating a vehicle without a license. The court determined that by failing to appear, Wagner forfeited his right to appeal. The court reiterated that these “sovereign citizen” arguments “[do] not account for the obvious countervailing governmental interests involved” and will accordingly be rejected.”