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Caselaw 2015

Methodological Provisions: Case Law

Kochel v. South Lebanon Tp., Slip Opinion, 2015 WL 4393387 (M.D. Pa. July 25, 2015): per Yvette Kane, D.J., the court adopted the report and recommendation of US Magistrate Judge Carslon, which acknowledged that “declaratory or injunctive relief . . . are remedies under the Pennsylvania Constitution.” Jones v. City of Phila., 890 A.2d 1188, 1216 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2006).

Pennsylvania State Educ. Ass’n ex rel. Wilson v. Commonwealth, 110 A.3d 1076 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015): per Jubelirer, J., enjoined records maintained by the public school districts, which contain home addresses of public school employees, from being disclosed pursuant to a request under the Right To Know Law (“RTKL”) request, until the affected employees had written notice and a meaningful opportunity to object to the documents release. The court explicitly held that this holding was based on “the personal security exception” of the RTKL, with no mentioned of Article I, Sections 1 or 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.

In re Thirty-Fifth Statewide Investigating Grand Jury, 112 A.3d 624 (Pa. 2015): per Saylor, C.J., held that Pennsylvania Attorney General Kathleen Kane’s quo warranto action, seeking to quash the appointment of a special prosecutor must be denied, as the “supervising judge had statutory authority to appoint special prosecutor and separation of powers principles were not violated by appointment.” While the principle opinion did not mention the Pennsylvania Constitution, Justice Stevens’ concurrence briefly stated that “[u]ntil the Legislature provides appropriate statutory guidelines for the appointment of special prosecutors, we look to the Pennsylvania Constitution . . . and the former Independent Counsel Authorization Act for such guidance [on such an issue].”

Article I.  Declaration of Rights

Section 1: Due Process; Inherent Rights of Mankind

Swinson v. City of Philadelphia, Slip Opinion, 2015 WL 7887855 (E. D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2015): per Bartle, D.J., the court denied the City’s motion to dismiss and held that the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, which gives cities broad immunity from suit, does not erase any state law remedy for a homeowner when a city razes his home without notice.

Peake v. Com., 132 A.3d 506 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015): per Leavitt, J., the court held that the statutory lifetime employment ban contained in a statute to protect Pennsylvania’s older adults from exploitation, neglect, and abuse was unconstitutional as violating Article 1, Section 1’s due process requirement. The court held that the ban was not substantially related to the Act’s stated objective of protecting older adults.

Section 5: Elections

Banfield v. Cortes, 110 A.3d 155, 175 (Pa. 2015): per Stevens, J., held in part that the certification of direct-recording electronic voting systems (“DREs”) did not violate Article I, Sections 5 and 26 and Article VII, Section 6 of the Pennsylvania Constitution for being devices “susceptible to interference.” In so holding, Justice Stevens stated that the Court was “persu[ded] [by] the decisions of federal circuit courts that have held that DREs that register votes electronically without a voter-verified ballot do not severely restrict the right to vote.” Citing the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Weber v. Shelley, 347 F.3d 1101, 1106 (C.A. 9 2003) for the proposition that “state officials have the power to substantially regulate the election process as it is the job of democratically-elected representatives to weigh the pros and cons of various balloting systems.” (internal quotations omitted)

Section 6: Trial By Jury

Glencannon Homes Ass’n, Inc. v. North Strabane Tp., 116 A.3d 706 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015): per McCullough, J., the court held that the statutory damages cap under section 8553 of the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (PSTCA) did not violate the right to a jury trial guaranteed by Article 1, Section 6 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. The court followed established precedent from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court case of Zauflik v. Pennsbury School District, 104 A.3d 1096 (Pa. 2014), in doing so. The court also rejected the argument that the statutory cap resulted in an unlawful taking without just compensation in violation of Article 1, Section 10 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. The court followed Pennsylvania Supreme Court precedent in determining that if the Legislature has power to eliminate the right to recover against the Commonwealth in tort actions and eliminate causes of action, than it may limit the recovery on the on the actions which are permitted. Smith v. Philadelphia, 516 A.2d 306 (Pa. 1986).

Section 8: Search and Seizure

Com. v. Loughnane, 128 A.3d 806 (Pa. Super. 2015): per Ford Elliot, P.J.E., the three-panel court held that the federal automobile exception, as adopted by Com. v. Gary, 91 A.3d 102 (Pa. 2014), applies to vehicles parked in driveways at private residences, “because driveways are not part of a home’s curtilage, and an individual does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy over their driveway.”

In re I.M.S., 124 A.3d 311 (Pa. Super. 2015): per Bowes, J., the three-panel court held that given the Pennsylvania Supreme Court holding in Commonwealth v. Gary, 91 A.3d 102 (Pa. 2014), which aligned Pennsylvania Constitution’s search and seizure law (Article 1, Section 8) with federal Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999) is the controlling authority in the pending case. In Wyoming v. Houghton, the United States Supreme Court held that the federal warrantless automobile search exception includes containers belonging to passengers in the vehicle.

Com. v. Bland, 115 A.3d 854 (Pa. 2015): a four person Court, per Saylor, C.J., held that to require a suspension of questioning by law enforcement officials on pain of an exclusionary remedy, an invocation of Miranda-based right to counsel must be made upon or after actual or imminent commencement of in-custody interrogation. After conducting an Edmunds analysis, the Court found that there was no reason to depart from federal law and that Article 1, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution did not afford greater protection.

Section 10. Initiation of Criminal Proceedings; Twice in Jeopardy; Eminent Domain

Glencannon Homes Ass’n, Inc. v. North Strabane Tp., 116 A.3d 706 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015): See Article 1, Section 6 above.

Section 11: Courts to be Open; Suits Against the Commonwealth

Russo v. Allegheny County, 125 A.3d 113 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015): per Gardner Collins, SJ., the three-panel court held that the Court of Common Pleas, as a court of the unified judicial system, is entitled to the sovereign immunity of the commonwealth. The court also held that the General Assembly did not intend for the judiciary to be in included within the definition of an employer subject to the whistleblower law because it would “infringe on separation of powers.”

Section 13. Bails, Fines and Punishments

Com. v. Walter, 119 A.3d 255 (Pa. 2015): per Todd, J., the court, inter alia, declined to reassess the constitutionality of the death penalty per se. The case came before the Court after the PCRA court granted relief, reinstating Appellant’s right to file a direct appeal nunc pro tunc from the judgment of sentence of death. Saylor, C.J., concerned with “glaring post-conviction issues” dissented and would have dismissed the appeal and remanded for a post-conviction hearing, factual findings, and legal conclusions on Appellant’s broader post-conviction claims.

Section 21. Right to Bear Arms

Stewart v. Fedex Exp., 114 A.3d 424 (Pa. Super. 2015): per Strassburger, J., the court held that the termination of an employee for violating the company’s firearm policy did not violate public policy, so as to fall within public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine. The court stated that Article 1, Section 21 of the Pennsylvania Constitution “does not bestow on any person the right to carry a concealed firearm or transport a loaded firearm in a vehicle.” Com. v. McKown, 79 A.3d 678, 690 (Pa. Super. 2013). Olson. J., concurred in the result.

Section 27: Natural Resources and the Public Estate

Feudale v. Aqua Pennsylvania, Inc., 122 A.3d 462 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015): per Brobson, J., the court continued to follow the precedent it set forth in Pennsylvania Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth, 108 A.3d 140, 156 n. 37 (Pa. Cmmw. Ct. 2015), that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s plurality opinion on the construction of Article 1, Section 27 “was persuasive only to the extent it is consistent with binding precedent from this Court and the Supreme Court on the same subject,” and continued to use the balancing test established in Payne v. Kassab, 312 A.2d 86, 94 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1973).

Pennsylvania Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth, 108 A.3d 140 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015), reargument denied (Feb. 3, 2015): per Brobson, J., held in part that funds derived from leasing of state lands for oil and natural gas development were not required, pursuant to Article I, Section 27, to be reinvested into conservation and maintenance of Commonwealth’s public natural resources. Plaintiffs had sought to have the use of funds for any other purpose, aside from the purposes of the Environmental Amendment, declared unconstitutional.

Section 28: Prohibition Against Denial or Abridgment of Equality of Rights Because of Sex

Hargrave v. Ramsey, 2015 WL 2445940 (E.D. Pa. May 21, 2015): in a memorandum opinion, per McHugh, D.J., the plaintiff’s complaint, alleging race discrimination in violation of the Pennsylvania Constitution was dismissed. The court held that the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act is the exclusive remedy for discrimination claims in the workplace.

Article II.  The Legislature

Section 1: Legislative Power

Protz v. WCAB (Derry Area School District), 133 A.3d 733 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015): per Pellegrini, P.J., an en-banc panel of the court held that Section 306(a.2) of the Pennsylvania Worker’s Compensation Act is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority under Article 2, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution because it proactively approves versions of the America Medical Association Guides beyond the Fourth Edition without legislative review. Section 306(a.2) of the act requires that the most recent version of the American Medical Association Guides be used to determine a claimant’s impairment rating.

Derry St. Pub, Inc. v. Pennsylvania State Police, Bureau of Liquor Control Enforcement, 111 A.3d 1240 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015): per McCullough, J., held, in part, that the statutory scheme allowing Liquor Control Board to enact a conditional licensing agreement (“CLA”) was not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. Judge McCullough wrote that Article II, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution allows the legislature to “impose upon others the duty to carry out the declared legislative policy in accordance with the general provisions” of the statute,” which allowed the LCB to enter into the CLA at issue here.

Article III. Legislation

Section 1: Passage of Laws

Leach v. Com, 118 A.3d 1271 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015): per Simpson, J., the Commonwealth Court voted 7-0 that Act 192, which broadened legal standing to challenge municipalities over gun regulations and also allowed plaintiffs to collect legal fees, violates the state’s original purpose rule, Article III, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. The court also held that the Act violated the state’s single subject rule, Article III, Section 3 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Judge McCullough concurred in the majority’s opinion regarding the original purpose rule, but dissented in the single subject rule decision.

Section 3: Single Subject Rule

Sernovitz v. Dershaw, 127 A.3d 783 (Pa. 2015): per Saylor, C.J., the Court held that Act 47 of 1988, passed twenty-two years ago, was “immune to attack” on the basis of a single-subject rule challenge. The Court noted that invalidating provisions of the act retroactively would “be unduly disruptive to the orderly administration of justice in Pennsylvania.” The Court held that its ruling applied equally to the Article I, Section 1 and 4 challenges currently pending before the Superior Court.

Leach v. Com., 118 A.3d 1271 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015): See Article III, Section 1 above.

Section 14. Public Education

William Penn School Dist. v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Educ., 114 A.3d 456 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015): per Pellegrini, PJ., the court held that the political question doctrine precluded judicial review of challenges to the public school funding scheme.

Section 27: Changes in Term of Office or Salary Prohibited

Meade v. City of Philadelphia, 65 A.3d 1031 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015): per Pellegrini, P.J., the court, in an unreported decision, declined to extend Article III, Section 27’s prohibition against cutting the midterm pay of public officer, to cover the attorney fees for challenging an ordinance that sought to cut pay.

Article IV. The Executive

Section 9: Pardoning Power; Board of Pardons

Com. v. Williams, 129 A.3d 1199 (Pa. 2015): per Baer, J., the Court held that the Governor acted within his constitutional authority under Article 4, Section 9(a) of the Pennsylvania Constitution to grant reprieves by issuing a temporary reprieve to death-row inmate pending receipt of report of Task Force and Advisory Committee on Capital Punishment and until concerns raised by Task Force were addressed, despite uncertainty as to when the reprieve would expire.

Section 16: Partial Disapproval of Appropriation Bills

Scarnati v. Wolf, 135 A.3d 200 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015): per Leadbetter, J., an en-banc panel of the court held that the governor could line item veto portions of the Fiscal Code Amendment under his Article 4, Section 16 authority because it was deemed to be a “bill making appropriations of money, embracing distinct items.”

Article V. The Judiciary

Section 1: Unified Judicial System

Russo v. Allegheny County, 125 A.3d 113 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015): per Gardner Collins, SJ., the three-panel court held that the Court of Common Pleas, as a court of the unified judicial system, is entitled to the sovereign immunity of the commonwealth. The court also held that the General Assembly did not intend for the judiciary to be in included within the definition of an employer subject to the whistleblower law because it would “infringe on separation of powers.”

Section 9 . Right of Appeal

W. Chester Univ. of Pennsylvania v. Schackner, 124 A.3d 382 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015): per Pellegrini, P.J., the three-panel held that a third party had an independent basis under due process (Article 5, Section 9), outside the provisions of the Right To Know Law, to appeal an Office of Open Records final determination. The court noted that the appeal was limited to the identifiable property interests seeking to be preserved.

Bray v. McKeesport Housing Authority, 114 A.3d 442 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015): per Jubelirer, J., the court held that the denial of an application for federally-subsidized public housing is a final decision subject to judicial review under Article 5, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.

Section 10. Judicial Administration

Com. v. Olivo, 127 A.3d 769 (Pa. 2015): per Baer, J., the Court held that a statute allowing expert testimony regarding victims’ responses to sexual violence does not violate the Supreme Court’s exclusive control over judicial procedures because the statute governs a substantive rule of evidence and does not violate the Court’s Article V, Section 10(c) authority over procedure.

Ostrowski v. Killion, Slip Opinion, 2015 WL 5286622, (M. D. Pa. September 10, 2015): per Rothstein, D.J., the court granted the Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Plaintiff asserted that the court should review the attorney disciplinary procedures established by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court because it violates the U.S. Constitution’s “separation of powers.” The Court dismissed the assertion because the federal separation of powers doctrine does not relate to provisions of the state constitution.

Article VI. Public Officers

Section 7. Removal of Civil Officers

Arneson v. Wolf, 124 A.3d 1225 (Pa. 2015): per Baer, J., the 4-1 Court adopted the Commonwealth Court’s opinion, Arneson v. Wolf, 117 A.3d 374 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015), which held that the Office of Open Records is a sui generis agency and that its Executive Director is insulated from a Governor’s power to remove appointees at will. The Court noted “when the legislature creates a public office in accord with Article VI, Section 1, it may impose terms and limitations regarding tenure or removal as it sees fit, thereby limiting the Governor’s power of removal under Article VI, Section 7.” The Court endorsed the Commonwealth Court’s examination of the statutory construction and legislative intent of the Executive Director of the Office of Open Records. Todd, J., dissented and would have adopted Pellegrini, P.J.’s dissent in the Commonwealth Court’s decision that it is within a Governor’s constitutional authority to remove the Executive Director of the Office of Open Records.

Article VII.  Elections

Banfield v. Cortes, 110 A.3d 155, 175 (Pa. 2015): per Stevens, J., held in part that the certification of direct-recording electronic voting systems (“DREs”) did not violate Article I, Sections 5 and 26 and Article VII, Section 6 of the Pennsylvania Constitution for being devices “susceptible to interference.” In so holding, Justice Stevens stated that the Court was “persu[ded] [by] the decisions of federal circuit courts that have held that DREs that register votes electronically without a voter-verified ballot do not severely restrict the right to vote.” Citing the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Weber v. Shelley, 347 F.3d 1101, 1106 (C.A. 9 2003) for the proposition that “state officials have the power to substantially regulate the election process as it is the job of democratically-elected representatives to weigh the pros and cons of various balloting systems.” (internal quotations omitted)

Green Party of Pennsylvania v. Aichele, No. CIV.A. 14-3299, 2015 WL 871150 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 2, 2015) aff’d, No. CIV.A. 14-3299, 2015 WL 2180435 (E.D. Pa. May 11, 2015): per Dalzell, J., held in part that that in-state witness requirement for recorded signatures on nomination papers was not so narrowly tailored “as to effectuate Commonwealth’s compelling interest in fairly resolving signature challenges” and violated First and Fourteenth Amendments as applied to plaintiffs, notarization requirement, as applied to the Plaintiffs, violated the First Amendment, and that the prohibition on “qualified electors” signing more than one nomination paper for each political office to be filled in election year as applied violated Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause. The case arose when the Green and Libertarian political parties and affiliated individual supporters filed suit challenging Pennsylvania’s enforcement of three provisions of its Election Code.

Article VIII.  Taxation and Finance

Section 1: Uniformity of Taxation

Nextel Communications of Mid-Atlantic, Inc. v. Com., 129 A.3d 1 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015): per Brobson, J., an en banc panel held, in a 5-2 decision, that Pennsylvania’s Net Operating Loss (NOL) cap violates the Uniformity Clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution. The court granted the taxpayer the right to deduct its NOLs without regard to the statutory NOL cap, which resulted in a refund to taxpayer.

Kauffman Metals, LLC v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 126 A.3d 1045 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015): per Leadbetter, J., the three-panel court held that there is no indication that members in a bona-fide partnership and members in a non bona-fide partnership are similarly situated, and accordingly it does not create a uniformity problem when the Department of Labor & Industry exempts bona-fide partnerships from paying unemployment compensation taxes.

Nernberg v. Borough of Sharpsburg, Pa., Slip Copy 2015 WL 1651011 (W. D. Pa. Apr. 14, 2015): per Conti, C.J., denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss on two courts against it, including one claim based on Article VIII, Section 1, of the Pennsylvania Constitution for uniformity in taxation. Judge Conti cited to Pennsylvania precedent stating that a “license fee, such as the one imposed by the ordinance, will be found unconstitutional if the fee charged is grossly disproportionate to the cost incurred by the municipality in regulating the act or business.” The Plaintiff’s claim was that a municipality was waging a “revenue raising” tax upon them by imposing an “ordinance imposes a bi-annual inspection fee of $60 per residential unit” for apartment complexes. Judge Conti wrote that while “there are few factual allegations [on the record], the allegation that Sharpsburg incurred no incremental costs and hired no employees is sufficient for the court to infer a plausible claim for relief under Pennsylvania law.”

Article IX. Local Government

Section 4: County Government

Munchinksi v. Solomon, 618 Fed. Appx. 150 (3d Cir. 2015): per Shwartz, C.J., the court held that 11th Amendment immunity did not apply to County prosecutors because they were sued in their individual capacities. The court further stated that even absent the individual capacity allegation, the prosecutors were not entitled to 11th Amendment immunity because, among other things, “Pennsylvania’s Constitution expressly defines District Attorneys as county rather than state officers.” Carter v. City of Philadelphia, 181 F.3d 339, 347 (3d Cir. 1999).