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2025

Article I, Section 1:

Commonwealth Charter Academy Charter Sch. v. Spicka, 2025 WL 763419 (Pa. Commw. Ct. March 11, 2025), per Jubelirer, J., the Commonwealth Court held that disclosure of redacted community class registration forms did not violate students’ or parents’ rights to informational privacy under Article I, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. The court found that the parents’ handwriting on the forms did not qualify for constitutional protection because handwriting, like a person’s voice or appearance, is regularly exposed to the public.

A.W. v. Department of Human Services, 2025 WL 1177990 (Pa. Commw. Ct.), per Wojick, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court held that the Child Protective Services Law’s lack of a pre-deprivation hearing, previously found unconstitutional as applied to teachers, does not violate due process when applied to non-teachers. Because Petitioners’ allegations of constitutional harm are contested, material issues of fact remain in dispute. Accordingly, the court denied the Petitioners’ Application for Summary Relief, without prejudice and set the case for discovery. 

G. F. v. Pennsylvania Department of Human Services – A.3d -, 2025 WL 1151594 (Pa. Commww. Ct.), per McCullough, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court reaffirmed a recent holding that under the Child Protective Services Law, teachers must be afforded a pre-deprivation hearing that embraces the basic elements of procedural due process before their placement on the ChildLine and Abuse Registry. Because the Pennsylvania Department of Human Services knew of this requirement but nonetheless failed to comply, the court granted Petitioner’s Application for Summary Relief.

Commonwealth Charter Academy Charter School v. Spicka, – A.3d -, 2025 WL 1451808 (Pa. Commw. Ct.), per Cohn Jubelirer, R., the Commonwealth Court held that there is no right to informational privacy under Article I, Section 1 of the Constitution in unredacted portions of Community Class Registration Forms that feature parental handwriting. The court reasoned that such handwriting does not disclose sensitive personal information, but instead reflects an attribute of that parent already held out to the public. The court limited its holding narrowly to parental handwriting.

Diaz v. State Real Estate Commission, 2025 WL 1861123 (Pa. Commw. Ct.), per Cannon, the Commonwealth Court upheld a final order of the State Real Estate Commission that revoked an individual’s inactive real estate license because of past financial-related criminal convictions. The court reasoned that although Article I, Section 1 provides a right for individuals to practice their profession, such right is subject to the lawful exercise of the police power. The court believed that this individual actively posed a threat to the public, and thus, the power to revoke his license did not violate the Constitution.

Ferguson v. Dep’t of Trans., Bureau of Driver Licensing, __A.3d__, 2025 WL 2044751 (Pa. Super. Ct.), per Mundy, the Court concluded that legislative determination to include Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition (ARD) as a prior offense for license suspension was neither unfair nor unreasonable and that the statute was rationally related to the legitimate governmental interest of preventing drunk driving. The Court rejected the argument that statutory suspension of one’s license following a DUI conviction—when the driver had previously resolved a past DUI conviction through ARD—violated Article I, Section 1 and Article I, Section 11.

Center for Coalfield Justice v. Washington County Board of Elections, __A.3d__, 2025 WL 2740487 (Pa. 2025), per Dougherty, J., The Court held that the right to vote is a protected liberty interest under Article I, Sections 1 and 5, and Article VII, Section 1 of the Constitution. The majority held that the Washington County Board of Elections’ 2024 practice of not notifying electors about disqualifying defects in their mail-in ballot return packets was unconstitutional. Justices Mundy, Brobson, and Wecht dissented. Justice Mundy disagreed with the majority’s decision to require elector notification of defective mail-in ballots through an online email system as some individuals are not required to provide their email address when applying for a mail-in ballot, nor do some have a stable internet connection. Justice Brobson, joined by Mundy and Wecht, dissented on several points and expressed concerns about the lack of uniformity of notice-and-cure procedures across counties.

T.G.A. v. Department of Education, __A.3d__, 2025 WL 3653628 (Pa. 2025), per Todd, the Court addressed arguments about the Department of Education maintaining records of suspension when the underlying claim of criminal misconduct was dismissed and the charges expunged. The Court concluded that the Article I, Section 1 right to reputation is of the highest order, placing it on the same level as the right to life, liberty, and property, and is worthy of the highest protection under the Constitution. The Court applied strict scrutiny to the acts of the Department of Education and concluded that the Agency did not articulate a compelling reason justifying the public display of the records.

Article I, Section 7:

Armslist LLC v. Facebook, Inc., — A.3d –, 2025 WL 996712 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2025), per McLaughlin, J., the Superior Court held that Facebook and Instagram’s removal of Armslist’s accounts did not violate the Pennsylvania Constitution because the platforms are private actors and the plaintiffs failed to allege sufficient government coercion to convert their conduct into state action. The court rejected Armslist’s argument that either entity deleted its accounts due to political pressure from members of Congress and found that pressure from federal legislators did not transform the platforms’ private decisions into Commonwealth action.

Commonwealth v. Nikonowicz, __ A.3d__, 2025 WL 3009233 (Pa. Super. Ct.), per Lazarus, P.J., the Superior Court reiterated that involuntary commitment implicates reputational rights protected by Article I, Section 1. Specifically, the court found that a procedural violation of the Mental Health Procedures Act warranted destruction and expungement of all records related to the involuntary commitment because the reputational interests of the Appellant extend beyond the duration of the involuntary commitment.

Article I, Section 8:

United States v. Skouras, 2025 WL 19818 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 2, 2025), per Conner, J., the Middle District of Pennsylvania held that a search warrant for the defendant’s property was supported by probable cause and thus constitutional under both the federal and Pennsylvania constitutions where there were multiple citizen complaints and police observations of drug-related activity. The court rejected the defendant’s argument that Pennsylvania’s Medical Marijuana Act invalidated the use of marijuana odor as a basis for probable cause, emphasizing that federal precedent still permitted reliance on such observations.

Commonwealth v. Herlth, – A.3d -, 2025 WL 892715 (Pa. Super. Ct.), per Stabile, J., the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that under Article I, Section 8, the “plain view” doctrine does not apply to an otherwise innocent-appearing, closed showbox in the living room of a drug addict suffering from a medical emergency. Further, individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in closed containers within their home, and officers cannot search these items without legal cause.

Commonwealth v. Hoyle, – A.3d -, 2025 WL 1418486 (Pa. Super. Ct.), per Ford Elliott, the Superior Court held that information obtained through one’s ETB Access card does not violate Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution. The court reasoned that through the “third-party doctrine,” individuals do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding information associated with their ETB card because they present that information to the store when they use the card.

Commonwealth v. Anderson, __A.3d__, 2025 WL 2055935 (Pa. 2025), per Dougherty, the Court held that person driving a car not registered to them does not waive the expectation of privacy in the vehicle under Article I, Section 8. There must be evidence of unlawful possession.

Commonwealth v. Lewis, __A.3d__, 2025 WL 2724795 (Pa. 2025), per Dougherty, J., the Court held that the existence of a high-crime area is not by itself sufficient to reach reasonable suspicion for police to conduct an investigatory stop. The Court refused to impose a strict, multi-element test for determining high-crime areas, leaving the designation to the suppression courts under the totality of the circumstances. Justice Donohue dissented, arguing that the designation of a high-crime area should not be used to justify a seizure without a clear connection to suspected criminal activity.

Commonwealth v. Williams, __A.3d__, 2025 WL 2080003 (Pa. Super. Ct.), per Stevens, P.J.E., The Superior Court decided three matters of first impression: First, a delay of 21 years between the filing of a complaint and the arrest of a defendant did not violate speedy trial rights under Article I, Section 9 when the cause of the delay was law enforcement’s inability to identify the perpetrator despite due diligence. Second, the warrantless search and seizure of trash for bottles with the defendant’s DNA did not violate Article I, Section 8 because there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in trash voluntarily discarded. Third, the warrantless extraction and analysis of DNA obtained from the defendant’s trash does not violate Article I, Section 8 because the analysis of voluntarily abandoned items does not require a warrant.

Commonwealth v. Choice, __A.3d__, 2025 WL 2672703 (Pa. Super. Ct.), per Murray, J., The Superior Court held, as a matter of first impression, that geofence warrants are constitutionally valid under Article I, Section 8. The court reasoned that the warrant was supported by probable cause, was narrowly tailored in it its geographic scope and time frame, and established an individualized probability that the information sought would yield evidence of a crime. The court rejected the argument that the geofence warrant constituted an unconstitutionally overbroad search.

Commonwealth v. Phinn, 348 A.3d 299, (Pa. Super. Ct.), per Bender, P.J.E., the Superior Court addressed whether the smell of marijuana and the perception of smoke coming from the Defendant’s person can give rise to reasonable suspicion for search under Article I, Section 8. The court concluded that the Medical Marijuana Act legalizes marijuana but does not permit the smoking of marijuana. Thus, seeing smoke surrounding the Defendants person in addition to the smell of marijuana, gives rise to reasonable suspicion, even if the officer does not see the person smoke.

Commonwealth v. Kurtz, 348 A.3d 133, (Pa. 2025), per Wecht, the Court held that there exists no reasonable expectation of privacy under Article I, Section 8 in unprotected internet searches and IP addresses. Chief Justice Todd and Justice Mundy filed concurring opinions and Justice Donohue filed a dissenting opinion. Donohue’s dissent emphasizes the necessity of internet access to participate in modern society and argues that the information stored by Google can provide a comprehensive virtual biography of the user. Donohue also argues that the warrant was justified on speculation rather than concrete facts and that legislative enactments such as the Pennsylvania Wiretap Act show that society expects privacy in digital data.

Rivera v. Borough of Pottstown, __A.3d__, 2025 WL 3522304 (Pa. Commw. Ct.), per Wallace, the court held the Borough’s Code provisions authorizing administrative warrants for biennial rental inspection on less than individualized probable cause were facially unconstitutional under Article I, Section 8. The court found that the drafters designed the probable cause standard to require that “there is a fair probability that relevant evidence will be found in a particular place.” This standard is higher than the federal standard and now applies to administrative warrants for rental inspections.

Article I, Section 9:

Rodriguez v. Pennsylvania Housing Finance Agency, __A.3d__, 2025 WL 3223189 (Pa. Commw. Ct.), per McCullough, the Commonwealth Court addressed whether Petitioner’s due process rights under Article I, Sections 1 and 9 were violated when she was not granted a formal hearing after she applied for Pennsylvania Homeowner Assistance Fund funding. The court held that various correspondence between the Petitioner and agency provided Petitioner sufficient opportunity to show financial hardship as a result of COVID-19, which the Petitioner failed to do. Thus, the court concluded that she was provided the opportunity to be heard.

Article I, Section 10:

Commonwealth v. Kujawa, 332 A.3d 835 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2025), per Beck, J., the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that the prosecutor’s failure to property prepare a state trooper did not amount to prosecutorial overreach sufficient to bar retrial under the Pennsylvania Constitution. The court explained that although Article I, Section 10 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides broader double jeopardy protections than the federal Constitution, retrial is barred only where prosecutorial misconduct either intends to provoke a mistrial or is undertaken so recklessly that it demonstrates a conscious disregard for a substantial risk of depriving the defendant of a fair trial. Because the court found that the prosecutor’s carelessness in preparing the witness did not evidence intent to prejudice or reckless disregard tantamount to overreaching, double jeopardy did not bar a retrial.

Commonwealth v. Garcia-Andrade, 2025 WL 1879255 (Pa. Super. Ct.), per Lane, J, the Superior Court explained that the Pennsylvania Constitution—Article I, Section 10—provides individuals more “Double-Jeopardy” protections than the federal constitution. Specifically, the court reiterates “that it is the intentionality behind the Commonwealth’s subversion of the court process, not the prejudice caused to the defendant, that is inadequately remedied by appellate review or retrial.” Thus, the court concludes that for Article I, Section 10 protections to apply, there must be some intentional prosecutorial overreach that prejudices the defendant. The reprosecution was not barred in this case.

Commonwealth v. Smith, __A.3d__, 2025 WL 1905381 (Pa. Super. Ct.), per Nichols, J., the Superior Court upheld a lower court’s determination that the prosecution’s failure to turn over body-camera footage until after the trial began did not invoke double jeopardy protections under Article I, Section 10. The court further explained that for double jeopardy protections to apply in Pennsylvania, there must be prosecutorial overreach which includes a reckless act, or an act committed with a consciences disregard for a substantial risk of denying a fair trial. The court determined the omission to be negligent, not reckless.

Article I, Section 11:

Ferguson v. Dep’t of Trans., Bureau of Driver Licensing, __A.3d__, 2025 WL 2044751 (Pa. Super. Ct.), per Mundy, the Court concluded that legislative determination to include Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition (ARD) as a prior offense for license suspension was neither unfair nor unreasonable and that the statute was rationally related to the legitimate governmental interest of preventing drunk driving. The Court rejected the argument that statutory suspension of one’s license following a DUI conviction—when the driver had previously resolved a past DUI conviction through ARD—violated Article I, Section 1 and Article I, Section 11.

Winig v. Office of District Attorney of Philadelphia, 347 A.3d 2 (Pa. 2025), per Brobson, the Court decided that sovereign immunity under Article I, Section 11 protected the Philadelphia District Attorney and others from suit where a man’s wife secretly recorded conversations between herself and her husband in violation of the Wiretap Act. The case further explains that Article I, Section 11 confers upon the legislature the discretion to permit suits against the Commonwealth at its discretion, which it has done in the Sovereign Immunity Act but the act excluded the suit here.

AmerisourceBergen Sourcing, LLC v. Commonwealth, __A.3d__, 2025 WL 3724077 (Pa. Commw. Ct.), per Leadbetter, the court addressed the government’ arguments that Article I, Section 11 should be considered when determining what constitutes confidential information for tax purposes. AmerisourceBergen sought relief from an order directing the Commonwealth to redact the amount of tax at issue from its status reports filed in consolidated cases. The court held that Article I, Section 11 is not absolute and can be balanced against other interests, such as the confidentiality of taxpayer information as designated by The Fiscal Code and the Tax Reform Code. Accordingly, the court determined that the presumption of openness did not overcome certain confidentiality requirements of taxpayer information.

Article I, Section 13:

Commonwealth v. Davis, 333 A.3d 731 (Pa. Super Ct. 2025), per McLaughlin, J., the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that the imposition of a mandatory sentence of life without the possibility of parole for a third-time enumerated sexual offense does not constitute a cruel and unusual punishment under Article I, Section 13 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. In applying only Eighth Amendment “as-applied” jurisprudence, the court found that because of Defendant’s repeated commissions of child pornography offenses, the graphic nature of the videos Defendant disseminated, and Defendant’s remorseless disposition, the mandatory sentence imposed was not grossly disproportionate to the crime committed.

Article I, Section 14:

Commonwealth v. Langley, __A.3d__, 2025 WL 1905538 (Pa. Super. Ct.), per Nichols, J., the Superior Court affirmed a lower court’s determination in denying bail under Article I, Section 14 that the individual posed a significant threat to the public, considering many factors including the individual’s character, behavioral history, and nature of the offenses. The court determined that the individual posed a danger that could not be abated by bail conditions.

Article I, Section 17:

City of Pittsburgh v. Fraternal Order of Police, — A.3d –, 2025 WL 826274 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2025), per Jubelirer, J., the Commonwealth Court held that an arbitration award reducing a police officer’s discipline was not a violation of the Contracts Clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution. The court found that the award was not a legislative act that would trigger protections under Article I, Section 17, but rather an administrative decision resolving a private contractual dispute between the city and the police union and the arbitrators acted within the authority granted to them by the parties’ collective bargaining agreement.

Article I, Section 20:

Bard v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, 2025 WL 2992494 (Pa. Commw. Ct.), per Dumas, the Commonwealth Court addressed a prisoner’s Article I, Section 20 claim that a prison violated his rights by refusing to send his mail due to lack of funds in his inmate account. The court held that prison operations and grievance procedures are generally not subject to judicial review unless they involve a constitutionally protected interest impacted by a final decision. Because the claim involved internal interpretation of prison grievance procedures, the Court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction.

Article I, Section 27:

In re FDR Park, __A.3d__, 2025 WL 2325411 (Pa. 2025),  per Leavitt, the Court held that the Commonwealth Court retains jurisdiction over claims arising under Article I, Section 27. The court reasoned that because the Environmental Rights Amendment affects the work of all branches of the Commonwealths’ government, the Commonwealth Court may consider environmental issues in conjunction with other legal claims. The case was remanded for further proceedings to determine if the city of Philadelphia complied with its responsibilities under Article I, Section 27.

Article II, Section 1:

East Coast Vapor LLC v. Dept. of Revenue, — A.3d –, 2025 WL 24357 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2025), per Wolf, J., the Commonwealth Court held that provisions of the Tobacco Products Tax Act (TPTA) that allowed the Department of Revenue to request information from applicants for a manufacturer’s license was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. The court found that the TPTA’s licensing provisions failed to provide sufficient standards to limit the Department’s discretion and therefore violated Article II, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which vests legislative power solely in the General Assembly.

Z&R Cab, LLC v. Philadelphia Parking Authority, – A.3d -, 2025 WL 1161995 (Pa. Commww. Ct.), per McCullough, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania held that Act 64 corrected the constitutional shortcomings of Section 5707 of Act 94. Act 64 requires legislative approval for the Philadelphia Parking Authority’s budget and fee schedule and provides that certain parties can challenge the Authority’s assessments. The court found that there was no unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority to the Parking Authority because the budget and fee schedule required legislative approval.

Grant Schmidt, Shot Tec, LLC v. Paris, __A.3d__, 2025 WL 2249527 (Pa. Commw. Ct.), per Dumas, the Commonwealth Court upheld the Commonwealth’s regulatory framework surrounding the Uniform Firearms Act (UFA) but ruled that the Montgomery County Sheriff’s licensing and inspection policy was unconstitutional under Article II, Section 1. The court ruled that the Montgomery Sheriff’s office went beyond its statutory authorization in granting licenses by compelling oral answers to various questions, requiring broad document production, and creating a “scoring system” that graded compliance and tracked violations. The court upheld the constitutionality of warrantless searches and seizures of the UFA, insofar as those searches were constrained to narrow, statutorily imposed boundaries.

Article II, Section 15:

Hommich v. Boscola, — A.3d –, 2025 WL 24368 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2025), per Jubelirer, J., the Commonwealth Court held that Senator Lisa Boscola was protected by legislative privilege under Article II, Section 15 of the Pennsylvania Constitution when she used the plaintiff’s name to refer to a legal loophole in a memorandum. The plaintiff, a solar energy developer, sued for defamation after Senator Boscola circulated a memorandum to fellow legislators advocating for a bill to close the so-called “Hommrich loophole.” The Commonwealth Court found that the memorandum was part of Senator Boscola’s core legislative function and thus protected under legislative privilege.

Article III, Section 18:

Herold v. University of Pittsburgh, — A.3d –, 2025 WL 258783 (Pa. 2025), per Todd, C.J., the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the interpretation of the Occupational Disease Act (“ODA”) must align with Article III, Section 18 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which requires reasonable compensation for workplace injuries. The court acknowledged that the constitutional history of workers’ compensation in Pennsylvania reflects an intent to ensure workers receive compensation while allowing for an exclusive statutory remedy system. Thus, the court found that claims for occupational diseases, such as mesothelioma, which manifest beyond four years after the last employment are not barred by the ODA’s exclusivity provision and that the ODA’s four-year statute of limitations does not preclude an employee from pursuing common-law claims against an employer.

Article IX, Section 2:

Conference of Presidents of Major Italian American Organizations, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, __A.3d__, 2025 WL 2233079 (Pa. Commw. Ct.), per McCullough, the court used both Article IX, Section 2 and inherent separation of powers doctrine to hold that the under Philadelphia’s Home Rule Charter, the creation or elimination of City holidays is essentially a power of the City legislature, not the executive. Thus, the court struck down Executive Order 2-21, which sought to eliminate Columbus Day in the City and replace it with Indigenous People’s Day.

Article IV, Section 20:

Lara v. Commissioner Pa. State Police, 125 F.4th 428 (3d Cir. 2025), per Jordan, J., the Third Circuit held that Pennsylvania laws prohibiting 18-to-20-year-olds from carrying firearms in public during a state of emergency violated the Second Amendment. The court also considered Article IV, Section 20 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which was amended to limit the governor’s authority to issue emergency declarations to 21 days. The court noted that while this amendment reduced the likelihood of prolonged emergencies, the historical pattern of frequent emergency declarations in Pennsylvania made it likely that similar constitutional challenges would arise.

Article V, Section 5:

Carr v. First Commonwealth Bank, — A.3d –, 2025 WL 912542 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2025), per Kunselman, J., the Superior Court held that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant nunc pro tunc relief allowing an untimely appeal from a common-law arbitration award because it violated the Pennsylvania Constitution’s separation of powers by exceeding the jurisdictional boundaries set by the legislature. The Court held that Article V, Section 5 of the Constitution gives the legislature, not the judiciary, the authority to limit the jurisdiction of the courts and the statute clearly imposes a 30-day deadline to appeal arbitration awards. The court held that once that deadline expired, the trial court lost jurisdiction and could not revive it, even for equitable reasons like personal tragedy.

Article V, Section 9:

Commonwealth v. Burkholder, 333 A.3d 739 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2025), per Covey, the Commonwealth Court held that Article V, Section 9 of the Constitution requires courts to allow individuals to appeal their summary convictions nunc pro tunc when they miss filing deadlines through no fault of their own and lack recourse under the Post Conviction Relief Act. The court reasoned that denying these individuals the opportunity to appeal nunc pro tunc would deprive them of their constitutional right to a direct appeal.

Article V, Section 10:

T.M.H v. J.L., – A.3d -, 2025 WL 1231559 (Pa. 2025), in a per curiam order, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court exercised its authority under Article V, Section 10 to direct a trial court to hold a custody hearing within 30 days of the order to readdress standing, resolve outstanding custody petitions, and determine a custody arrangement in the best interests of a child. The Court affirmed the Superior Court’s ruling that the trial court had erred in granting primary legal custody to the Maternal Grandparents under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5324(3), given their failure to comply with procedural deadlines and the fact that child had not resided with them for the year preceding removal.

Matter of Cappuccio, __A.3d __, 2025 WL 1822058 (Pa. 2025), per Mundy, the Supreme Court exercised its Article V, Section 10(c) mandate to regulate the profession of law to reinstate the law license of an individual with a record of crimes involving minors. The Court determined that after fifteen years of “qualitative rehabilitation” the individual was not predisposed to future infractions of that nature. The Court sought to balance its constitutional responsibility to balance the regulation of the legal profession with the potential for rehabilitation and reintegration into the legal profession.

Article V, Section 12:

In re Huff, 334 A.3d 232 (Pa. 2025), per Brobson, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that Section 704(d) of the Election Code addresses voter registration, not candidate eligibility; therefore, issues pertaining candidate eligibility under Article V, Section 12 revolve around that individual’s “residence,” which the Court held is their domicile. The Court did not address the issue of whether, for purposes of eligibility to run for elected office, a candidate may obtain a domicile different from his spouse while in an intact marriage, because a Section 704(d) analysis settled the issue.

Article VIII, Section 1:

In re Mishrikey, 334 A.3d 417 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2025), per McCullough, the Commonwealth Court held that a residential property owner failed to meet their burden of proof to show that their property was assessed at a higher valuation than those of their neighbors, which, if true, would violate Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution. The court reasoned that the appellant failed to introduce evidence to establish the market value of the allegedly comparable properties, relying on too few and overly selective neighboring properties.

National Hockey League Players Association v. City of Pittsburgh, __A.3d__, 2025 WL 2745552 (Pa. 2025), per Wecht, the Court held that Pittsburgh’s “jock tax” was unconstitutional under Article VIII, Section 1. The “jock tax” imposed a 3% tax on income earned by non-Pittsburgh residents who used the city’s publicly funded sports stadiums, while residents were subject to a 1% city income tax and a 2% school district income tax. The Court determined that the tax scheme discriminated against nonresidents by imposing a higher tax burden on them without a legitimate reason to justify the disparate treatment. Such discrimination violated the Uniformity Clause.

Phoenixville Area School District v. Shi, 2025 WL 2739043 (Pa. Commw. Ct.), per Jubelirer, The Court determined that a school district’s property tax assessment did not violate the Uniformity Clause, Article VIII, Section 1. The policy used a monetary value threshold to select properties for appeal. The Court concluded that this did not violate the Uniformity Clause because the policy was applied neutrally, consistently across property subclassifications, and without regard for property type or residency status of the owner.

Dow Chemical Company v. Commonwealth, __A.3d__, 2025 WL 3703017 (Pa. Commw. Ct.), per Leadbetter, the court addressed an Article VIII, Section 1 challenge to the net loss carryover deduction for the corporate net income tax under the Tax Reform Code of 1971, arguing that these deductions separate classes of taxpayers based solely on income. Because the court had found similar provisions to violate the Uniformity Clause, the court concluded that the net loss carryover deduction does also.

Article VIII, Section 2:

Pottstown School District v. Montgomery County Board of Assessment Appeals, 335 A.3d 1125 (Pa. 2025), per Todd, the Court held that a hospital was entitled to a tax exemption under Article VIII, Section 2 of the Constitution. The Court reaffirmed the use of the 5-pronged HUP test and found that the hospital operated entirely free from a private profit motive despite the generous compensation of the hospital executives. The Court determined that that the compensation structure aligned with fair market value.

Misc.

Rogalski v. Department of Education, 2025 WL 1453348 (Pa. Commw. Ct.), per McCullough, the Commonwealth Court held that the Educator Discipline Act does not violate the Constitution. The court rejected the petitioner’s argument that the act lacks a rational basis and infringes on various constitutional rights. It concluded that the Act survives rational basis review because the state has a legitimate interest in disciplining educators with expired permits.

Commonwealth v. Coles, __A.3d__, 2025 WL 2908353 (Pa. 2025), per Wecht, dissented from a one-line order denying previously granted cert. Wecht argued that the Court should have determined whether flight from law enforcement alone gives rise to reasonable suspicion when the only factor is the person’s proximity to someone who was smoking marijuana. Reversing the grant of cert. upheld the lower court’s determination that by fleeing from police, the individual abandoned everything they left behind.

In re Biletnikoff, 343 A.3d 730 (Pa. Super Ct. 2025), per King, J., The Superior Court reversed an order from a lower court that prohibited a constable from wearing his uniform while performing non-judicial duties. The Superior Court reversed on separation of powers concerns—constables are executive branch employees, and judges only have the authority to regulate a constable’s conduct while performing official judicial duties. Allowing the judge to regulate the constable’s out-of-court conduct would constitute judicial overreach into the executive branch.

DiMeo v. Gross, Trustee of University of Pennsylvania, 2025 WL 3650761 (Pa. 2025), per Wecht, concurred in a one-line order denying previously granted cert. The issue involved a delayed continuance request for jury selection so the respondent could observe Yom Kippur. Wecht agrees with the disposition of the case, but cautions against using the Superior Court’s reasoning as a template because they ignored potentially dispositive constitutional issues. The case involved Article I, Section 3, and Wecht suggested that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court might reconsider whether Article I, Section 3 should be interpreted in lockstep with evolving First Amendment jurisprudence in future [religious freedom] cases.